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Summary. The paper studies the class SC ^ ' of cooperative 
games with player set N which have the semiconvexity 
property. SC u is decomposed into an algebraic sum of 
convex cones of games for which generating sets are 
available. The union of these sets thus forms a generating 
set for SC ~. Special attention is paid to one of the 
considered cones in the decomposition fSC u. In particu- 
lar, the so called airport savings games we,y e NN, defined 
by wy(S) = ~j~s Yj- maxj~s yj for 0 e S CN, are emphasi- 
zed. 
Zusammenfassung. In dieser Arbeit wird die Klasse SC N 
von kooperativen Spielen mit Spielermenge N, welche die 
Semikonvexit~it-Eigenschaft besitzt, untersucht. SC ~r 
wird in die algebraische Summe von konvexen Kegeln von 
Spielen zerlegt, fi2r welche erzeugende Mengen verfiigbar 
sind. Die Vereinigung dieser Mengen bildet dann eine 
erzeugende Menge for SC N. Einem der betrachteten Kegel 
der Zerlegung wird besondere Aufmerksamkeit ge- 
schenkt. Es werden speziell die sog. ,,Airport savings" 
Spiele wy, ye lR N, welche durch wy(S)=~.j~sYj- 
maxj~syj fiir 0 r S c N definiert sind, betrachtet. 
Key words: Semiconvexity, airport cost function, con- 
vexity, polyhedral cone, extreme direction 
Schliisselwiirter: Semikonvexit~t, Flughafen-Kostenfunk- 
tion, Konvexit~t, polyhedrale Kegel, extremale Richtun- 
gen 
1. Submodular cost and supermodular savings functions 
As an application of game theoretic analysis to the cost 
allocation problem, Littlechild and Owen (1973) studied 
the problem of setting airport landing charges for differ- 
ent types of aircraft. Their game theoretic approach to the 
* This work is part of the Ph.D. thesis of the first author (Derks 
1991) 
airport cost allocation problem is based on an approp- 
riately defined set function, the so-called airport cost 
function cy : 2 N--* N. Here N is the set of planes which are 
to land at the airport and y = (Yi)i~u denotes the costs for 
the planes i~N to construct a runway of appropriate 
length. Then the costs cy(S) of a subset S of planes is 
determined by that plane in S with the longest runway, 
i.e.~ 
cyta)_ _ = max Yi. 
iES 
The airport cost function cy satisfies the submodularity 
conditions 
ce(S)+cy(T)>cy(Su T)+cy(S~T) for all S, TcN. 
As usual, an arbitrary cost function c : 2 u -  ~, induces a 
savings function v : 2 u~ N by means of v(0) =0 and 
v(S)= ~ c({j})-c(S) foral lScN, S~O. 
jeS 
Here, the expression v(S) represents he cost savings that 
would result in the cost model if the participants in subset 
S cooperate instead of acting alone. Whenever the cost 
function csatisfies the submodularity conditions, then the 
induced savings function v satisfies the supermodularity 
conditions 
v(S)+v(T)<_v(SwT)+v(S~T) forallS, TcN. (1) 
With the cost vector y=(y~ ,Y2 . . . .  ,Yn) elR" we associate 
the savings function ~,y:2 N-F .  by means of 
N={1,2,. . ,n}, wy(0) = 0 and 
w~(S)= ~y j -  maxyj  for  a l lScN,  SeO.  (2) 
jeS j~S 
It can easily be verified that the savings function wy of (2) 
induced by an airport cost function and, thus, it satisfies 
the supermodularity conditions (1). 
In the game theoretic ontext, the term convexity is 
preferred to the term supermodularity. This paper focuses 
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on a related condition, the semiconvexity, which is a 
weaker condition than the convexity. 
In Sect. 2 the notion of semiconvexity for a cooperative 
game is described. Section 3 is devoted to a decomposition 
of the class of semiconvex games into an algebraic sum of 
three convex cones of games. The decomposition is
strongly based on the smallest convex cone of games 
containing the savings games of (2). Subsequently, a 
generating set for SC 'v is presented. SC u does not have 
extreme directions according to the fact that the IN[- 
dimensional linear subspace of additive games is con- 
tained in SC u. In Sect. 4 it is shown that the cone scrV of 0 - 
normalized semiconvex games is generated by 0-normal- 
ized games in the generating set of SC u as presented in 
Sect. 3. Furthermore, we will show that these games are 
actually extreme directions of SC6 v. 
2. The class of semiconvex games 
First let us briefly go into the game theoretic setting. We 
consider a cooperative game in characteristic function 
form, or simply a game, with finite player set Nto be a real- 
valued function v on the set 2 u of subsets of N with 
v(0) = 0. A subset S of N is called a coalition and v(S) is 
called its value in the game v. The value v(S) is interpreted 
as the gain or savings of the coalition S in the case the 
members of S decide to cooperate. The class of all games 
with player set N is denoted by G u. Note that G N is the 
(2 zur_ 1)-dimensional Euclidean vector space indexed by 
the non-empty coalitions. Except for an example in Sect. 3 
the player set N is supposed to consist of at least four 
players. Examples of games are the savings functions as 
defined in (2). We will refer to these games as the (airport 
cost) savings games. 
An element y = (Yi)i~ N of F, u is called an allocation. For 
a coalition S let the allocation eSe ~u be given by e s = 1 
for i e S and e s = 0 for i e N \  S. With the allocation y e l~, N 
we associate the game y : 2 N ~ IR by means of y(0) = 0 and 
y(S)=~]~sy] for all SEN,  S~0. Games which are 
associated with an allocation are called additive. The class 
of all additive games with player set N is denoted by A N. 
Notice that A N is an INI-dimensional linear sulspace of 
G u, which is generated by the additive games ul,- I and -uli I 
associated to the allocations e {'1 and -e  Iq respectively, 
with ieN.  We say the allocation yeR u majorizes the 
games v e G u (notation: y > v) if the additive game asso- 
ciated with the allocation y majorizes the game v, i.e. 
y(S)>v(S)  for all SEN.  
Throughout the paper we pay special attention to the 
marginal contribution allocation of a game. Given an 
arbitrary game N V e G the corresponding marginal contri- 
bution allocation b~ ,v e ~. is defined by b y = v (N) - v (N \  {i }) 
for all ieN.  
One of the main topics of research in cooperative game 
theory is how to allocate the value v(N) in a game v e G u 
among the players. Since the introduction of the notion of 
a cooperative game, many solution concepts for these 
games have been proposed to solve the relevant allocation 
problem. Generally speaking, the concepts provide satis- 
factory and stable solutions only on a specific subclass of 
the game space. Perhaps the best-known solution concept 
is the so-called core: an allocation ye  R 'v is said to be a 
core allocation of a game v e G u if y distributes the value 
v(N) among the players in such a way thaty majorizes v. In 
other words, the core C(v) of a game v e G u consists of all 
allocations y eR N satisfying y(N)  = v(N) and y > v. Ob- 
viously, there are games without core allocations. 
The solution part of cooperative game theory is mainly 
based on the traditional assumption that the grand 
coalition N will be formed. Note that the marginal 
contribution allocation b~ of a game v is derived from the 
marginal contributions of each player with respect o the 
formation of the grand coalition. We assert hat a player i
cannot demand a greater portion of the value v(N) than 
the amount by since he would otherwise force the other 
players to divide an amount less than v(N) -by = v(N\  {i}) 
among themselves. Thus, in distributing v(N) among the 
players only those efficient allocations hould be con- 
sidered which are majorized by the marginal contribution 
allocation bv. 
Now if a non-empty coalition S ~ N exists with ~'q~ s by 
< v(S) then the players in S will not be satisfied by an 
(efficient) allocation which is majorized by b ~. It seems, 
therefore, reasonable to examine the formation of the 
grand coalition only in a game v that fulfils 
~, b~ > v(S) for each non-empty coalition S. (3) 
jaS 
Games with this property are called semibalanced and are 
first discussed in Tijs and Lipperts (1982). 
Semibalancedness is a necessary condition for the non- 
emptiness of the core since for each game v and core 
allocation y e C(v) we have 
Yi = y(N) -y (N \{ i} )  <_ v(N) - v(N\{i}) = by 
for all i e N (4) 
and, therefore, v(S)<y(S)<b"(S)  for each coalition 
S E N, implying the semibalancedness of v. 
It may happen that the semibalancedness inequalities 
bo(S)>>_v(S), SEN,  even hold whenever an arbitrary 
marginal contribution by in the sum bo(S) is replaced by 
the individual value v({i}) of the player/involved. Remark 
that we interpret the marginal contribution of any player 
as a large payoff to the player and the individual value as a 
small payoff. Due to these reasonings, the class of 
semiconvex games is defined by 
SC N= {v e GN: b v_> v and bv(S\{i}) + v({i}) >_ v(S) 
for all i e N, all S E N with i eS}. 
Semiconvex games are introduced in Driessen and Tijs 
(1985) as an adjunct o the study of the z-value concept. 
There it is established that SC ~v is a (2 lul_ 1)-dimensional 
cone in G u which includes the class of convex games (i.e. 
games satisfying the supermodularity conditions (1)). 
More generally, a game v with the property that it fulfils 
the supermodularity conditions 
v(N) + v(S\{i}) > v(N\{i}) + v(S) for all i e S e N, (5) 
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:s se~Jconvex. To see this notice that (5) is equivalent o 
: "-: z-(S) - v(S\{i}) for all i e S e N, (6) 
.:__d ~.~is expresses the condition that the marginal contri- 
-'~::2cn of  each player to a coalition is largest for the grand 
c<:'--~on. The semiconvexity condition b~(S\{i})+ 
- - .>_v(S)  for an arbitrary non-empty coalition 
S = ,i2 i: . . . .  , ils I } now follows from the I S[ inequalities by 
="-'- ~-- ~),, b~i=_> v({i, i2})-v({i}), "'" be'Is,->v(S)-v(S\{i!sl})" 
A decomposition of the class SC ~r 
O'~- main goal is to decompose the class of semiconvex 
g'- . - -~ into an algebraic sum of convex cones of games for 
~-~aic~ generating sets are available. The union of  these 
generat ing sets forms a generating set for SC u. 
T'ne savings game w e of(2) associated with an arbitrary 
~,.~-atio n y ~ IR u is semiconvex. The class of these savings 
garam is not a convex cone as is illustrated by the 
fol lowing example. Consider the player set N={1,2,  3} 
(the example can easily be extended to arbitrary large N) 
and the savings games w~ and w e associated with the 
ailo~.-ations x = (0, 1,2) and y = (2, 1,0). In fact, the games 
w=. w~ and the sum game w = w, + wy are as follows. 
coalitionS 0 {1} {21 {3} {1,21 {1,3} {2,3} N 
value w~(S) 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 
value w,(S) 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 I 
value w(S) 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 2 
Suppose w equals w, for a certain allocation zfi lR 3. 
Then for a two-person coalition S we have 
w(S)  = w~(S) = ~'.i~s z j -  maxj~sZj = minims zj-. From this 
and w({1, 3})=0, we first derive that z1 =0 or z3=0 and 
subsequently, w({ 1,2}) < 0 or w({2, 3}) < 0; a contradic- 
tion. We assert hat the sum game w is not a savings game. 
Now the idea is to embed the class of these savings 
games in a convex cone generated by a finite number of  
appropriately defined savings games. For the sake of 
notation, the savings game associated with the allocation 
e s is shortly denoted by w," 2 u~ N.. Thus, Ws is given by 
J ISc~TI -1  i fS~T~0 
ws(Z)  
0 otherwise. (7) 
M 
We note that for coalitions S with IS[ >2 the marginal 
contribution allocation b ~,~ of the savings game Ws equals 
e s and in case IS[ < 1 then the savings game Ws equals the 
zero game and, thus, b~s=O. 
The next theorem states that each savings game 
associated with a non-negative allocation is a non- 
negative linear combination of the savings games Ws, 
S~N,  i.e. the class of non-negative savings games is 
embedded in the convex cone W u generated by the savings 
games Ws, S c_N. 
Theorem 3.1. Let Wy be the savings game of(2), with y ~ N :v. 
Then u,y a W ~v = Cone ({Ws: S _c N }). 
Proof Without loss of generality, the players may be 
ordered so that N={1,2  ... .  ,n} and O=yo<_ya<Y2<... 
<_y,. For any j~N,  define the set S j={ j , j+ I  . . . .  ,n} of  
players with index jor  a larger index. It is evident hat the 
vector equality Y=~]=l (Y j -Y j  1) esj holds. Now we as- 
sert that 
& 
w e = ~ (y j -y j _~)ws ;  (8) 
j= l  
To prove (8) let TeN,  T~ 0. Further, let m ~ T be the 
player in Twith the largest index. Then we get S jn  T= 0 iff 
m <j< n. Now it follows that 
~ (y j -  yj 1)w,j(T) 
j= l  
j - I  
j - I  
(y j -  y j - l )  EISj~TI - l] 
• (Yj -Yj-i)eTk - (Ym -Yo)  
j= l  k=j  
== ~. (Yj-- Y j - t )er- -  ym 
k=l j=l 
= ~. Yke r -- Ym 
k : l  
~'. Yk - max )'k = we(T). 
keT  keT  
We conclude that (8) holds. This completes the proof  of  
the theorem. [] 
From the fact that the class of semiconvex games is a 
convex cone containing the savings games ws, S_c N, we 
conclude that the cone W 'v is included in SC N. Without 
going into details we note that the games in W u possess a
large core because of the convexity property for these 
games (cf. Sharkey 1982). 
Next, we present asubclass of semiconvex games with a 
unique core allocation. Let the class H u of games be 
defined by 
tt u = {v s G u : (v ({i }))i~ u is a (unique) core allocation of  v}. 
According to (4) each core allocation is majorized by the 
marginal contribution vector; in particular, v ~ H u yields 
that by>v({i}) for all iEN, and from this we deduce that 
for all i~N and all SeN with i aS  we must have 
b~ ~.y~sv~j})>_v(S). Thus, v~SC u. So, 
v E H N implies v ~ SC u. 
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So far we established that the class of semiconvex 
games contains the cones W N and H N, and containing 
games with a non-empty core. It furthermore contains the 
game "3 defined by 
"3(S)=I -1 i fSc_N, IS[>INI-1, 
L 0 otherwise. 
since it is a non-positive game, 0-normalized, i.e. v({i}) = 0 
for i eN, and with marginal contribution allocation b'; 
equal to the zero allocation. Notice that the core of"3 must 
be empty. 
Due to the fact that SC N itself is a convex cone, we 
conclude that the inclusion SC N ~_ H u + W u + Cone ({,3}) 
holds. According to the main theorem, the inverse in- 
clusion is also valid. 
Theorem 3.2. SC N = H N + W u ~- Cone ({"3}). 
ized game v-y ,  we obtain that v-yaHN+WU+ 
Cone({"3}). From this and ye l l  N, we conclude that 
V=v--y+yeHN+WN+Cone({"3}) for all v  9  N. [] 
With the aid of the theorem we are able to present a 
generating set for SC u. By its definition, the cone W u is 
generated by the set {Ws :S c N, I S I > 2}. A generating set 
for the cone H N can be found by noting that H N is the 
algebraic sum of the class A N of additive games and the 
class 
{V e GN: v(N) = 0, v({i}) = 0 for all i 9 Nand 
v(S) <_ 0 for all other S c N}. 
which is actually the class Ho ~ of 0-normalised games in 
H N. It is obvious that H0 N is generated by the set 
{- ] i s :ScN,  2_<IS[<[N[-1} of games, where the unity 
game ] iseG u is given by 
Proof Let v e SC u. We distinguish two cases. ] is(T)=l i f T=S and 
Case one. Suppose that the game v is 0-normalized, i.e., 
v({i}) =0 for all ieN. Then the semiconvexity of v yields 
that b~>_v({i})=O for all iaN. From b~ and The- 
orem 3.1 we derive that the savings game wy is contained 
in the cone W N. Consider the game 
W = I) --  Wbv -- a"3 ,  
where a denotes the scalar bO(N)- v(N)-maxj~Nb~. We 
assert hat w(S)<O for all SEN.  Indeed, 
w({i}) = v({i})=0 for a l l i  9  
w(N) = v(N) -  b~ + max b7 + a = 0, 
j~N 
w(N\{i})= v(N\{i}) - bV(N\{i}) + max 
j eN\{ i}  
= max b~-  maxb~ 
j eN\{ i}  j~N 
b j+  a 
< 0 for a l l i  9  and 
w(S) = v(S) - bY(S) + max b~ 
j eS  
< 0 fo ra l lScNwi th  [SI<IN[-1, 
where the last inequality results from the 0-normalized- 
ness and the semiconvexity of v. Hence, w(S)<O for all 
S _ N. Together with w (N) = 0 and w ({i }) = 0 for all i e N, 
this implies that the zero allocation is a core allocation of 
w and, therefore, we H N. Further, the semiconvexity of v 
yields that a > 0. Thus, a"3 e Cone ({"3}). We conclude that 
v = w + wb~ + a"3 9 HN+ wN+ Cone ({"3}). 
Case two. Evidently, the additive game y e G N associated 
with the allocation y = (v({i}))i~u also belongs to the class 
H u. Furthermore, it is straightforward to verify that the 
semiconvexity of v implies the semiconvexity of the game 
v -y .  By applying case one to the semiconvex 0-normal- 
]Is(T) = 0 for all T ,  S. 
Corollary3.3. A generating set for the class SC N of 
semiconvex games is formed by the 2 INI" 1 1 games 
ui, -ui, i e N, 
-]is, S c N with 2 <ISI <_INI-1, 
Ws, S c_ N with 2 <IS[ <[NI, and the game ~. 
The class SC u does not contain all games with a non- 
empty core. To show the interrelation of SC N with the 
class of games with a non-empty core consider the 
decomposition for a game v with core allocation y into the 
non-negative linear combination of the games u{il, -ulij, 
ieN, and -]is, O§  as follows (cf. Spinetto 1974): 
v= ~ yiuli}+ ~, ( ~ y i -v (S ) ) ( - l l s ) .  
i eN  O~ScN ieS  
Thus, the mentioned games generate the class of games 
with a non-empty core. Only the games -]i{q, i eN, in this 
decomposition have not been mentioned in the corollary 
above and, indeed, these games are clearly not semicon- 
vex. 
4. The class of 0-normalized semiconvex games 
Except for the additive games, the generating games in the 
above corollary are 0-normalized. In fact they form a 
generating set of extreme directions of the class SC0 uof 0- 
normalized semiconvex games: 
Theorem 4.1. The 2 INI+I - 21NI - 1 games 
-]is, ScNwi th2<[S l<[N l -1 ,  
Ws, S c_Nwith 2 <lSl<lN~,, andthe game~ 
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form a generating set of the class SC~ of O-normalized 
semiconvex games. Furthermore, they are extreme direc- 
tions in SC~'. 
Proof. Observe that each game in W N is 0-normalized. 
Also, - u3 9 SC0 u. We, thus, have H~ + W N + 
Cone ({-u3}) c SC~. Consider the decomposition of a 0- 
normalized semiconvex game v as w* wb0-aft  in the 
proof  of  Theorem 3.2. The 0-normalizedness of the games 
v, Who and -a~3 implies the 0-normatizedness of w  9  ~' 
and, thus, HoN+ W N~- Cone {-u3} D SC0 u. Let Wdenote the 
set of  games mentioned in the theorem. We conclude that 
W is a generating set of SC0 u. 
Let us prove the extremeness of  the games in W. 
The extremeness of -u3 and -1Is, with SeN,  
1 < I S I <IN] - 1, follows from the fact that for each of these 
games w there exists a coalition S with w(S) = - 1 and such 
that its value with respect o the other games in W is non- 
negative; therefore, w cannot be represented as a non- 
negative linear combination of  the other games in W 
implying its extremality. 
SuEPose --lly\{il equals a non-negative combination, 
say 2,w~wa~w, of elements of  W. Using the additivity 
property of the marginal contribution allocation 
(b . . . .  =ab ~ + b~ for.all  v, waG u and acid,,), b-is=O, 
2 <IS I<[N I -1 ,  and bw=O, we have 
~{i} =b-lu\[,i = ~ a~b ~ 
waW 
jan  SgN, ISI>I 
and this equality only holds in case a-*N\t,~ = 1, a-l~\~JJ = 0 
for all jeNN{i}, and aws=O for each coalition S with 
[S ]>I .  Then also a-ls=O for each ScN with 
1 <lSI <INI- 1. Therefore, -'IN\Ii l ~ Cone (W\{- lg \ l i l  }), 
implying its extremality. 
Now let Wr be a non-negative combination, say 
~w~wa~w, of elements of W, with TeN,  1 < [TI, arbi- 
trary. From 
"IIZ=b~r= E a~b~ 
waW 
= E a-lu\lA'lI{J} + E ctws~S 
jaN ScN, lS[>l 
it follows that a~=0 for the games w=--~NX{jl, with 
j aN\T ,  and W=Ws, for coalitions S, 1 <lSI, such that 
S\T  is non-empty, i.e., 
1 = a-l,v\~'~ + "~ a*s, for each i e T. 
S~T, ISl>l,ias 
Adding the I Zl equalities of  (9) we obtain 
(9) 
ITI = Y Z 
j eT  ScT,]S]>I 
Furthermore, 
a 'qS I .  (to) 
[T I -  1 = wr(N) = ~ aWs(IS[ - 1) - a -~; 
Sc_T, ISI> I 
= 2  w'lst- 2 
ScT, ISf>I scT,[SI>I 
Combining (10) and (11) we obtain 
(ll) 
a-l,v,{/} + ~ aws + a -~ = 1 
j~T Sc_T, ISI>I 
In combination with (9) this is only possible if a-ao,[,~ = 0, 
for j  9  T, a ~r = 1, aWs = 0 for S c T, I SI > l, and a -~ = 0. It 
follows now that a-ls=O for all ScN,  ISl> 1, and we 
conclude that the game wr must be extreme. [] 
Notice that only the games --'~N\{i}, ieN,  Ws, Sc_N with 
2 _<IS[_<INI, and u3 fulfil (6). These games are, therefore, 
extreme in the cone of 0-normalized games which obey (6). 
Furthermore, the games w s, S c Nwith 2 <q SI<LNI, are 
convex implying that these games are extreme directions 
in the cone of 0-normalized convex games. 
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